Atestan Atestan

Five questions. Five different proofs.

The model is decomposed on purpose. The five levels are not a chain in which proving A proves B, C, D and E. Each answers a different question and carries different assumptions — which is why each one below says what it establishes AND what it does not.


01

Proof model

  1. Signature

    Signed by the issuing organisation

    Built and tested

    What it establishes

    Evidence about the origin of the seal: whether it can be attributed to an enrolled organisation under the applicable rules.

    What it does NOT establish

    That the requested action was received, carried out, or legally valid. And it establishes the ORGANISATION, not the individual behind the keyboard.

  2. Recipient resolution, at the date of issue

    Addressed to your organisation

    Built and tested

    What it establishes

    Evidence about the intended recipient: that the request was meant for the named party, rather than a generic artefact anyone holding a copy could replay.

    What it does NOT establish

    Receipt, execution, or legal validity. Being addressed to someone is not the same as reaching them.

  3. Acknowledgement / workflow

    Receipt acknowledged

    Specified, not yet built

    What it establishes

    Evidence that the named party actually received it — a separate question from whom it was addressed to.

    What it does NOT establish

    That anything was done about it. Receiving a payment instruction is not paying.

  4. Closure / proven absence

    Action not executed

    Specified, not yet built

    What it establishes

    Evidence about completion or closure of the requested action.

    What it does NOT establish

    That the action was the right one, or that anyone was entitled to ask for it. Receiving a contract does not prove it was signed; signing it does not prove it should have been.

  5. Public anchoring at closure

    Complete proof, publicly anchored

    Specified, not yet built

    What it establishes

    That the relevant record can be re-established later by someone who trusts neither party — the point of the anchoring design.

    What it does NOT establish

    That keeping an internal record is enough. An archive one party controls is not independent reconstruction.

02

Five mechanisms, not one chain

These rungs are not links in a single homogeneous cryptographic chain. Signature, recipient resolution, acknowledgement, closure and anchoring are distinct mechanisms with distinct assumptions. Anyone who tells you “signed, therefore received, therefore not executed” is selling you a chain that does not exist.

The verifier reports evidence, not optimism

An incomplete proof is never rounded up into a confident verdict. What is shown is what the evidence establishes at the level actually reached — which is more useful than one green word that hides which part was proved.

Where we are today — In this order, and it stops where the proof stops. Two of the five are BUILT AND TESTED; the other three are specified and not built. And none of them answers a reader today: the service is running, but no organisation is enrolled and no seal has been issued, so the page establishes nothing for anyone yet — it says which is which every time it answers.